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Abstract 
This study provides an overview of funding mechanisms in Croatian health care and 
analyses them in terms of sustainability, efficiency and equity. The study presents an in 
depth investigation of problems facing funding health care in Croatia: high expenditure, 
inadequate financial resources, continuous deficits of the state insurance fund, lack of 
transparency in funding, an aging population etc. Furthermore, the study provides a 
critical overview of reforms that have been implemented to counter those issues from 
1990 to 2002. The study argues that, in addressing financial deficits, the implemented 
reforms over relied on acquiring additional financial resources into the funding system 
and on shifting health expenditure from public to private sources. The study argues that, 
instead, the reforms should have focused more on curbing rising expenditure in health 
care providers. Emphasis has been put on the extent to which the reforms affected the 
conceptual – social foundations of the system. Finally, the paper provides 
recommendations for policy makers in Croatia and presents an overview of Croatian 
experiences that might be of interest to researchers and policy makers internationally. 
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Introduction 
The Croatian constitution defines the Republic as a social state and proclaims social 
justice to be one of the highest values of the country’s constitutional order [1]. Croatia’s 
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health care system is based on the principles of inclusivity, continuity and accessibility 
[2]. All citizens of the Republic of Croatia have the right to health care services 
throughout their entire lives and the network of health care providers ought to be 
organized in a way that makes it “approximately equally accessible” to all citizens. 
Compulsory health insurance, the foundation on which citizens acquire their right to 
health care, is mandatory for everyone and based on the principles of reciprocity and 
solidarity [3]. Social health insurance (SHI) in essence, its central concept ought to be to 
achieve a set of societal objectives through financial cross-subsidies; from healthy to ill, 
from well-off to less well-off, from young to old and from individuals to families. The 
redistributive focus distinguishes SHI from what is normally understood as “insurance” – 
the latter being an actuarially precise device by which individuals seek to protect their 
own interests rather than a means of contributing to the best interest of the entire 
population [4, 5].  
 
Since independence in 1991, Croatia’s health care system has been witnessing, as many 
others throughout Europe, a constant mismatch between available public resources and 
ever rising expenditure. It has undergone a series of reforms that have attempted to tackle 
some of the issues contributing to the escalating crisis; the most notable ones for funding 
health care carried out in 1990, 1993 and 2002. The 1990 reform centralized the 
previously decentralized system of collecting funds and separated the previously unified 
regional systems of managing health care providers from collecting compulsory health 
insurance in an attempt to facilitate state control over management and financing. The 
1993 and 2002 reforms focused on cost containment. The 1993 reform reduced the scope 
of health care services free at the point of use citizens previously enjoyed on the basis of 
compulsory health insurance and introduced private health insurance for services and 
providers not covered under compulsory health insurance. The 2002 reform further 
decreased the scope of health care services free at the point of use and introduced 
complementary health insurance into the funding system for services not fully covered 
under compulsory insurance. The reforms largely concentrated on acquiring additional 
financial resources into the funding system and on shifting health expenditure from 
public to private sources. In doing so, they have compromised the system’s social 
concept, without adequately addressing the real problem behind the mismatch– high 
health expenditure. 
 
 
 
Contextual factors  
In October 1991 Croatia officially declared independence from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The country inherited a fragmented, decentralized health care 
system that faced a prolonged professional and financial crisis [6]. The five years of war 
from 1991 to 1995, following Croatia’s declaration of independence, caused considerable 
damage to the country’s housing and public services infrastructure estimated at USD 
37,116,679,000. Up to 20,000 persons have been reported killed or missing and more 
than 30,000 people have been disabled [7]. Approximately 27,000 square kilometres, or 
47.5 % of the Croatian continental territory, containing approximately 1.5 million 
inhabitants were affected by war. At the end of 1991, as much as 11.5% of the population 
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lived in partly or fully occupied areas. Displaced persons and refugees from neighbouring 
Bosnia and Herzegovina flooded the country. During the period of 1992 and 1998 the 
number of refugees and displaced persons was between 430,000 and 700,000 [8]. By 
1994, GDP dropped to 50% of its pre-war level in 1990 [9]. These factors have, coupled 
with soaring unemployment (i.e. over 16% in 1996) and ongoing demographic transition, 
additionally burdened the already troubled health care system.  
 
 
Health expenditure 
For 2002 (last available data), the World Health Organization estimates Croatia’s per 
capita total expenditure on health at 630 USD - international dollar rate [10]. In 
comparison to other South Eastern European countries, current candidates for 
membership or countries aspiring to become candidates for membership in the European 
Union, the figure is above average. However, Croatia significantly lags behind most of 
the newly admitted countries into the European Union and even more so behind the old 
member states (see table 1).  
 
Largely under influence from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) 
recommendations (see for example [11], at least according to WB estimates, Croatia has 
been able to decrease total expenditure on health from 10.2 percent of GDP in 2000 to 9.1 
percent of GDP in 2002 [12]. The decline could be attributed to both GDP growth from 
year 2001 to 2002 that has been 4% and 5% annually respectively [13], and to the decline 
of per capita total expenditure on health from 689 to 630 USD international dollars rate, 
or by almost 9 percent from 2000 to 2002 (calculated on the basis of [10]; as can bee 
observed on tables 2 and 3. Despite the reductions, with 9.1% of GDP spent on health in 
2002, Croatia still spends a considerably larger proportion of its GDP on health care in 
comparison to other Central and Southern European countries and the majority of EU 
member states (see table 4).  
 
 
The reasons behind high costs 
Croatia, unlike many of the formerly communist CEE countries, did not inherit an 
excessively over built health care system. However, there is an inherent assumption that 
significant scope for cost containment exists through efficiency gains on the provider side 
of the health care market. Inappropriately designed infrastructure, outdated technology 
and inefficient deployment of management, staff and resources all contribute to the 
imbalances and inefficiencies in health care provision and the high health care costs 
produced by the system [12]. Another consideration might be the high expectations the 
population holds of the health care system. Prior to the transition to market economy, the 
health care system (although lacking in financial resources) was characterised by a high 
level of equity and services virtually free at the point of use [14]. Citizens’ dissatisfaction 
with market elements and cost containment measures gradually introduced into the 
system has resulted in considerable pressures towards politicians and the state 
government that have hampered the introduction of “unpopular” but necessary reforms. 
 
The funding system 
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Croatia operates a Social Health Insurance system that covers the major part of public 
expenditure for health care services, with a single sickness fund for the entire population 
of the country – the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance (CIHI). CIHI is a “quasi 
independent” public body. Although formally independent, the state government 
effectively controls it as it appoints its director and board of directors (upon the 
recommendation of the minister of health) and has the authority to dismiss them [3]. 
 
Funds allocated for health care are annually determined by the state budget and collected 
through the state treasury. CIHI receives compulsory insurance funds from the state 
budget. Those funds originate from three sources: contributions for compulsory health 
insurance, funds collected by general taxation and county funds colleted from regional 
taxes. CIHI dispenses the majority of compulsory health insurance funds for provision of 
health services and a small proportion for infrastructure investments in publicly owned 
providers. In order to receive public funds for providing health services, all providers 
regardless of ownership are required to enter into annual contracts with the Croatian 
Institute for Health Insurance that dictates prices for services and forms of payments [3].  
 
Patients are required to pay out of pocket to privately owned providers (not contracted by 
CIHI), and if they do not have complementary health insurance, co-payments to providers 
contracted by CIHI for services not fully covered or not covered by compulsory health 
insurance. CIHI collects premiums for complementary health insurance on its own. 
Although informal payments do not form a part of the official funding system and are 
furthermore illegal, based on published research [15], it would not be realistic to deny 
their existence in Croatia, as seems to be the case in the greater part of Central and 
Eastern Europe [16]. Private insurers collect premiums for supplementary insurance that 
can be used with contracted private or publicly owned providers. 
 
The central government and counties collect additional funds for health care from general 
taxation and dispense them separately from CIHI for investments into infrastructure and 
technical equipment and maintenance of publicly owned providers. The Ministry of 
Health accounts for a minor part of health expenditure; it annually spends around 0.2 – 
0.3 % of GDP on public health programmes, planning, regulation etc [12]. 
 
 
The Public/Private split in health care funding 
According to Croatian Government estimates of the structure of health care funding in 
Croatia, the private component continuously stagnated around 2% of GDP from 1999 to 
2002 (with GDP increasing), while the public component of funding decreased from 
8.2% in 2000 to 7.6% 2001 and finally to 7% of GDP in 2002 [12] (see table 5). Due to 
Government initiated reforms aimed at cost containment, rationing of services, the 
expansion of private health care providers and above all due to the 1993 and 2002 
amendments to the Health Care Act that significantly increased the role of user charges in 
Croatian health care, Government estimates of the private part of health care funding may 
be underestimated, as shall be later discussed in greater length.
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It should be noted that WHO, WB and Croatian government estimates vary slightly. 
World Health Organization Health Report 2005 estimates seem to describe most clearly 
that private expenditure in funding health care in Croatia is on the rise. Furthermore, 
WHO estimates allow for comparison between Croatia and other countries (see table 6). 
Although Croatia seems to be positioned among some of the countries with greatest 
proportions of government funding in total health care expenditure, clear patterns of 
decreasing the role of public funding and increasing the role of private funding from 2000 
onwards can be recognized. 
 
 
Compulsory Health Insurance 
 
In general, funding health care through payroll taxes (which are typically proportional 
and have a ceiling) is less progressive than funding health care through general taxation 
[17]. Some commentators argue that the reform process over the last 15 years has 
internationally reduced and even in some cases eliminated certain financial distinctions 
between SHI and tax based systems introducing a larger role of tax funding into SHI 
systems [18]. In France, from 2002 the broad CSR tax supplements the state imposed 
mandatory wealth tax introduced in 2000. Greece and Belgium generate nearly the same 
amount of revenue from taxes as from SHI premiums [19].  
 
As elsewhere in social health insurance countries [20], the funding of Croatia’s 
compulsory health insurance system does not depend solely on salary contributions. 
Although regular annual CIHI financial reports do not report a clear division of revenues 
between salary contributions and general government taxation revenues, some data have 
been made available in the 2003 World Bank study on the Croatian health care system. 
While salary contributions accounted for 75%-82% of compulsory health insurance 
revenues from 1999 to 2002, the remaining part of compulsory health insurance revenues 
originated largely from central government transfers, but also from other sources such as 
loans, interest rates, rent etc [12 ] (see table 7). This is not surprising as an analysis of the 
structure of the insured reveals that in 2002 and 2003 only 34% and 35% financially 
contributed to the fund, the remaining majority consisting of the unemployed, retired, 
dependants, refugees and others relieved of contributions (see table 8)  [21, 22]. 
 
The 2002 health care reform established the principles of central and local government 
responsibilities for subsidizing premiums for special categories of population: children 
under 18, the retired, the unemployed, war veterans and disabled (roughly 70 % of the 
population). In reality, health care costs incurred by those categories have been primarily 
subsidized by contributions from workers and farmers. Central government transfers have 
rather been made retroactively to cover the shortfalls in CIHI budget or to cover deficits 
accumulated by the health care providers, rather than for specific aspects of health 
insurance according to prospectively agreed set of obligations [12]. This creates a 
potential detrimental incentive towards CIHI’s technical and administrative efficiency 
and to its credibility in enforcing financial discipline among health care providers, as it 
creates a widespread impression that the central government will cover any accumulated 
deficit at the end of the fiscal year, without considering how it was created; i.e. in 2003 
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annual hospital expenditure limits (set by the Ministry of Health) were enlarged on four 
occasions [22]. 
 
As in most other SHI countries, compulsory health insurance in Croatia still does not tax 
overall income, but only salaries. This is in effect regressive, as individuals may possess 
other sorts of income besides salaries such as rent, bank interest etc. and as it does not 
allow for a greater proportional burden to be placed on those who are better off. 
Furthermore, the rate of contributions in Croatia is uniform for all workers regardless of 
salary (15%), as it is in the majority of other SHI countries. Some countries, such as 
Austria have adopted rates that vary according to employment status [23]. This 
instrument allows for a greater proportional burden to be placed on those with higher 
income. 
 
Health care expenditure that has been, according to World bank estimates, significantly 
higher than in other European countries with similar GDP and the fact that 
compensations and allowances such as sick and maternity leave allowances and transport 
costs compensations are paid from compulsory health insurance funds; have lead the 
Croatian Institute for Health Insurance to accumulate net financial losses in all 
consecutive years from 1998 -2001 (data for earlier years not available) [12]. While these 
have partly been covered by loans and government subsidies, they have been 
accompanied by a process of substantial and systematic reduction of rights to free health 
care services and introducing increasing co-payments to virtually all services provided 
and rationing [14]. Combined with other health care reforms it has lead to a lower 
standard of health care, which is particularly noticeable in preventive services. The 
decline in numbers of preventive checkups and GP home visits in Croatia has potential 
negative consequences on the health of vulnerable groups such as children, women, 
workers in hazardous occupations and elderly people [24].  
 
 
The Macroeconomic context for compulsory health insurance 
 
The 1993 health care reform set the contribution rate for salaries to 18% (paid in full by 
employers) in an attempt to check the galloping health care expenditure incurred from 
1991 to 1993. The high rate burdened the weakened labour market which from 1993 to 
2000 suffered unemployment rates as high as up to 15% [11]. In 2000 the contribution 
rate was thus reduced to 16% (of which 7% was paid by employer and 9% by employee). 
The 2002 reform further reduced the contribution rate to 15% of gross salary (paid by 
employer in full). From 2002, additional income individuals earned from work not related 
to salaries also became taxable at the same rate. No ceiling to contributions was set and 
dependants receive coverage without additional charges. In comparison with other 
Central European SHI countries: Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic; Croatia’s 
contributions are still higher than average (see table 9). The employers/ employees split 
of contributions in Croatia does not effectively contribute to progressivity nor to the 
regressivity of the system as contributions are exempt from tax. If contributions are 
exempt from tax, the contributions cost the same for employers to pay as increasing 
 7 
wages and for employees to pay and in principle it does not make a difference who pays 
[26].  
 
 
Although the government reduced the contribution rate for compulsory health insurance 
on several occasions since 1993, in terms of macroeconomic efficiency, the implications 
of comparatively (to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe) still high compulsory 
health insurance contributions have an impact on the international competitiveness of 
national businesses. For example, contributions directly affect hourly wages and thus the 
costs of finished goods in the international marketplace [18]. An additional concern is 
their effect on the ability of the Croatian market to attract foreign investments that could 
potentially play an important role in living up the economy, as has been the case in 
several Eastern European Countries in the last decade such as the Slovak republic (see for 
example [27]. 
 
Besides facing developments such as the introduction of new expensive technologies and 
rising expectations of the population that contribute to rising health care costs globally, 
Croatia’s social health insurance system faces several additional challenges that threaten 
its economic sustainability. An analysis of the structure of insured by categories reveals a 
low percentage of those who actively financially contribute to the fund compared to the 
total number of beneficiaries. As the system still largely depends on salary contributions, 
this also makes it highly dependant on the economic situation on the country’s labour 
market; which has from 2000 to 2004 suffered unemployment rates from 19 to 22% [28]. 
Another consideration is the aging of the Croatian population, caused by long standing 
decreases in natality, fertility and natural increment [29], with almost 22% of the 
population aged over sixty in 2003 [10] and the consequent reduction in the ratio of 
active workers who financially contribute to the system compared to the number of 
retired.  
 
Informal economy is an additional issue. In 2000 the informal part of the economy in 
Croatia was equivalent to roughly 7% percent of GDP, compared with an estimated 37% 
in 1993 [30].  This, in part due to with widespread tax evasion through mechanisms such 
as underreporting of earnings and salaries and due to weak administrative capacity to 
enforce tax collection; has lead the government in 2002 to centralize the flow of all 
public revenues to a single fund – the central treasury. It was though that the collection of 
all state revenues through a single account would alleviate analysis, comparison and 
would stimulate greater fiscal discipline in the economy [11]. In relation to health care 
expenditure, the role of central treasury was also conceived with the intention of 
enhancing debt collection and debt management and harmonizing CIHI’s budget 
administration with government’s fiscal policy and budget planning [12].  However, as 
estimates for 2003 indicate that informal economy still poses a significant complication 
in the Croatian market as its presence is significantly above OECD average [31], 
additional efforts need to be carried out to tackle this issue in order to enhance the 
financial flow into the health care system. 
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Complementary health insurance  
The reform carried out by the 2002 health care law aimed to improve the financial 
sustainability of the system by reducing the scope of basic covered services free at the 
point of use. The law introduced a new co-payment price schedule for selected services in 
the current benefit package, with higher rates for hospital and specialist services, 
diagnostic tests, and pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, the law narrowed the structure of 
categories of beneficiaries exempted from co-payments to some extent compared with 
prior years, although major categories of exemptions remained the same [3].  
 
The 2002 health care law introduced voluntary Complementary Health Insurance into the 
funding system. Until 2004 offered exclusively by CIHI, the premium for complementary 
insurance is community rated and was set at HRK 80 (EUR 10.80) per month, retired 
HRK 50 (EUR 6.75) per month. It restores full rights to free health care at the point of 
use in publicly contracted providers. It can be paid by employers or employees and is 
fully tax deductible [32]. In 2003 Complementary health insurance was purchased by 
729,915 citizens, roughly 16 % of the Croatian population [22]. 
 
The Complementary health insurance premium does not directly link financial 
responsibility to individual risk as it is community rated, but it adds to the regressivity of 
the system as it is set as a lump sum and as it does not tax citizens according to wealth 
and ability to pay, but rather according to health status. This is evident from the limited 
data available from the structure of the ensured, where the retired (who are of worse 
health status than the employed) make roughly 51% of clients [22], while they account 
for less than 25% of the population. However, Complementary health insurance does 
partially redistribute funds from the employed to the retired, as the retired, who are more 
financially challenged than the employed, pay a reduced premium.  
 
 
Making Complementary and Supplementary health insurance premiums, co-payments 
and private payments tax deductible is an additional regressive element newly introduced 
into the system. The effective rebate received by the covered individual is equal to the 
cost of the coverage provided multiplied by that individual’s income tax rate which rises 
with income [33]. 
 
Complementary health insurance, as could have been expected as it was instituted as 
voluntary insurance with a community rate premium, pooled higher than average risks 
due to adverse selection (i.e. 51.65% of insured in 2003 were retired). Nevertheless, due 
to its high premiums it created financial surpluses of HRK 144,000,000 (EUR 
19,433,198) in 2002 and HRK 17,178,659 (EUR 2,272,309) in 2003 [21, 22]. Although 
official data are currently not publicly available, government officials’ statements 
indicate that in 2004 Complementary insurance accumulated a net financial deficit of 
HRK 137,000,000 (EUR 18,293,497) and is no longer financially sustainable. Taking 
into consideration the composition of its ensured population, this is not surprising as 
already in 2003 it had attracted a disproportional amount of heavy spenders which had 
serious implications for its sustainability. 
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Although it appears that the 2002 Health Care Law had certain successes in terms of 
public sector cost containment; other potential effects also deserve analysis. In effect, 
shifting health care costs to users substantially contributes to the regressivity of the 
funding system [33, 34]. The 2002 law has further increased out of pocket payments for 
health care have which were already at a level that seemed to pose a substantial burden to 
many people, particularly those in lower socioeconomic groups [15, 35]. Thus, with 
restricted services covered by compulsory insurance and increased cost sharing it put low 
income groups at a particular disadvantage in terms of access to health care [36, 37]. 
Although its effects on the populations’ health status have not been officially analyzed, 
international experience shows that cost sharing reduces utilization of both effective and 
ineffective health care services [38]. Furthermore, it can be linked to poorer health 
outcomes on several different indicators with disproportional effects on poor people [39] 
- who have less money to spend. 
 
Private expenditure 
The inflow of private funds and user charges into the Croatian health care system 
originates from four sources: private health insurance, co-payments to providers 
contracted by CIHI, out of pocket payments to providers not contracted by CIHI and 
informal payments. As was already discussed, reliable data on private expenditure are not 
available, but in 2003 the government estimated private expenditure for years 1999 to 
2002 at a uniform rate of 2% of GDP [12]. While it is obvious that the Croatian 
government accentuated the role of user charges in the funding of the Croatian public 
health care system in both major reforms in 1993 and 2002, the situation with private 
providers not contracted by CIHI is more uncertain. Loosely regulated by the health care 
law, they are free to set prices for medical services they provide (not covered by public 
funding) at their own will and enter into agreements with private insurers. Furthermore, 
the services they privately provide and charge are neither subject to systematic 
surveillance nor analysis and thus they themselves and the effects of health reforms on 
their charges remain virtually unknown.  
 
Prior to their transition to market economy, informal (under the counter) payments made 
an important feature of health care systems in most Central and Eastern European 
countries [40]. Unfortunately, there are plenty reports that testify of their continued 
presence in more recent times ([41, 42, 43]. Due to the fact that informal payments are 
illegal and thus hidden in Croatia, very few reliable data on them can be found. A study 
implemented in Croatia in 1994 found that 14% of all respondents reported giving gifts 
and 8% reported giving “gratitude” money for services received in publicly owned 
providers of health care [36]. Besides baring an undesirable impact on the efficiency of 
their provision [42,43], informal payments have been found to represent a highly 
regressive way of funding health care services [40]. 
 
Private health insurance in Croatia plays a marginal role in funding health care as it does 
in most European Union countries [44]. In 2002, private health insurers reported annual 
revenues of HRK 962 million (EUR 130 million) or roughly 6% of total health 
expenditure [12]. Prior to 2002, individuals with annual income over a certain limit 
(annually determined by the Minister of Health) were allowed to opt out from the 
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compulsory health insurance system and to insure with privately owned insurers instead. 
The 2002 Health care law prohibited opt-out and confined the benefits of private 
insurers’ schemes to supplementary insurance benefits such as providing a higher 
standard or quality of care and faster access (i.e. by avoiding waiting lists in public 
hospitals) through private providers, extra services and drugs excluded from the 
compulsory insurance plan, and hotel amenities in publicly owned hospitals. It was 
recognized that opting out of statutory health insurance threatens the long term financial 
sustainability of SHI schemes as it tends to attract younger and healthier people, leaving 
the former with a disproportionate number of large families, older people and people in 
poor health [45]. As a consequence, the 2002 Health Care Law severely undermined the 
market for private insurance. Currently six insurance companies in Croatia offer private 
health insurance. Due to a loose regulatory framework they are able to offer risk rated 
premiums with benefits designed in order to drive away high risks and maximize profits. 
Additionally, they support the creation of a two tiered system for the better off (who can 
afford private insurance) and the worse off who can not. 
 
Funding health care system infrastructure 
Similar as in Germany, where the 16 Lander governments pay for major capital 
investments [23], funds for health care providers’ infrastructure and funds for capital 
investment and technical equipment are collected and distributed separately from health 
insurance funds and CIHI. Conceptually, responsibility for those expenses is distributed 
on the ground of ownership. Thus, the central government funds clinical hospitals and 
clinical hospital centres, counties fund general and special hospitals and primary health 
care centres in their ownership etc.  
 
However, the central government annually distributes the minimal amount every county 
is required to spend for capital investments primarily on the basis of the size of covered 
population, but also on the basis of the number of facilities and beds in each county. 
County governments are obliged to plan additional funds from their own budgets for 
decentralised health care functions. If they are unable to collect additional required funds 
through taxes, the central government may allocate the difference [46]. This measure 
clearly intends to act in order to preserve equity between the worse off and better of 
counties as, for example in 2003 GDP per capita between the best off and the worst off 
counties varied  by a factor of 8 to 10 [47]. However, it is not clear to what an extent it 
actually manages do so as when analyzing need, it does not take adequate consideration 
of morbidity nor mortality rates, demographic structure etc. Available data for 2004 
indicate that the central government allocated a total of roughly HRK 400,000,000 (EUR 
53,404,540) for capital investments into all publicly owned health care providers in 
Croatia, what makes roughly 0.2 percent of GDP [46]. 
 
Additionally, CIHI may also allocate certain funds for infrastructure and technical 
equipment. For example, in 2003 it spent HRK 10,806,932 (EUR 1,429,488) for capital 
investments in publicly own health providers’ facilities or less than 1 percent of its total 
expenditure [21]. Apart from spending the funds received from central government, the 
World Bank estimates that, in 2002, county governments additionally spent roughly 3% 
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of their budgets or 0.2% of Croatia’s total GDP on decentralized health care functions 
[12]. 
 
 
Coverage and Distribution of services 
Although the Croatian Health Care Act proclaims that all Croatian citizens have the right 
to health care and thus that the health care system should strive towards universal 
compulsory health insurance coverage, this has however not been fully achieved. In 2003 
CIHI provided compulsory health insurance to a total of 4,296,955 citizens [22] (CIHI 
report 2004). According to a mid year estimate by the Croatian Central Bureau of 
Statistics, in 2003 Croatia had a total of 4,442,000 citizens [48] (RCCBS 2005). Thus, 
around 146 000 citizens or roughly 3.2 % of the population did not have compulsory 
health insurance in 2003. The analysis of same sources for 2002 reveals that in 2002 
roughly 4.6% of the population did not have compulsory health insurance. One of the 
possible contributors might be CIHI’s rather short deadlines (30-60 days according to the 
2002 Health Insurance Law) in which citizens have to apply for free compulsory 
insurance in situations such as after loosing employment, graduating from school or 
university etc. A comparison to several other countries that base the funding of their 
health care systems on social health insurance reveals slightly better results. In 2002, SHI 
coverage in Austria was estimated at 98%, France 100%, Luxemburg 97-99%, 
Switzerland 100% etc [26]. 
 
Less frequently discussed than funding, distribution of health services can also has 
implications on the progressivity of the entire system. For example, a proportional system 
might distribute benefits unequally to obtain the same redistributive effect as a 
progressive system [49]. Again, as CIHI does not publicize data on consumption patterns 
structured by income of beneficiaries, a thorough analysis can not be performed. 
However, available data for 2003 allow for a comparison which reveals that the retired 
spent, on average, substantially more funds on services than workers and farmers which 
is to be expected due to their relatively worse health status. However the disabled, on 
average, spent about equally funds as active contributors and workers, while unemployed 
spent by far the least amount. Taking their health and financial status in consideration, 
this might indicate a certain degree of regressivity in the distribution of health care 
services (see table 10).  
 
Conclusion 
Although certain temporary decreases have been achieved in 2001 and 2002, health care 
expenditure (as percentage of GDP) in Croatia is still considerable and in 2003 it was 
once again on the rise ([21] and[22]). While, compared to other countries Croatia spends 
a disproportionate amount of its resources on health care, the system continues to struggle 
with high public expectations and financial deficits.  
 
Over the past ten years the government has attempted to stimulate cost containment 
through various measures aimed at providers including rationing of services, limitation of 
services provided, penalties for excessive prescribing or referrals, a limited list of 
approved drugs, reductions in health budgets; but with only limited success and 
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acceptance from providers and the public [14, 50]. Thus, pressured by constant health 
care deficits, the impression is that the government has kept the weight of its focus on the 
demand side of the market reducing the public part of expenditure and increasing co-
payments in order to address excessive demand for unnecessary health care services and 
to collect additional revenue. From a sustainability and efficiency point of view, there is 
controversial evidence regarding how beneficial cost sharing arrangements can actually 
be. 
 
Although user charges exist in some form or another in most European countries, in 
Western Europe they are primarily used under the argument of confronting patient moral 
hazard, i.e. that their absence encourages excessive demand of unnecessary health care 
services [38]. However, due to the fact that the health care market is supply side 
dominated due to asymmetry of information and the agency relationship between 
physicians and patients [51], even without taking supplier induced demand into 
consideration (as Croatian physicians working in publicly owned provider do not receive 
payment on the basis of fee for service) measures aimed at physicians rather than patients 
may prove to be more effective in confronting excessive unnecessary demand [45].  
 
An alternate argument for user charges, used mostly in CEE is that of additional revenue 
collection [38]. However, experience from other countries has shown that user charges 
can be complex and expensive to implement and administer [52] and that although they 
can be used to supplement public revenue; total revenue from user charges has rarely met 
its expectations. Thus, user charges need to be considered in the context of the 
managerial and administrative capacity needed to implement them and the time and 
additional costs they impose [39]. 
 
The Government’s continuing reliance on increasing private funding in addressing 
financial insolvency in the system also raises considerable concern with regards to its 
conceptual social foundations. Out of pocket expenditure conversely affects equity in the 
system as it necessarily puts a heavier strain on household budgets of lower income 
individuals and families against of those with higher levels of wealth [33, 34, 38, 53]. To 
continue, out of pocket charges have been shown to discourage lower income individuals 
from seeking necessary care [53, 54]; thus reducing equity of access [55] and potentially 
negatively affecting their health status. 
 
Croatia should, when addressing health care funding invest additional efforts into fighting 
informal economy, thus enhancing the inflow of funds into the system. The government 
should also more strictly enforce the 2002 Health Care Law with regards to its 
obligations of subsidizing financially non contributing categories of the population and 
insist on a higher level of financial discipline in health care expenditure instead of 
continuing the practice of covering cumulated deficits.  
 
Furthermore, in addressing high expenditure in the health care system for its level of 
wealth, Croatia should transfer its focus of attention from the demand side of the health 
care market to its supply side. It should reduce overall costs through proved mechanisms 
that address providers of health care services rather than keep insisting on addressing 
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users’ excessive demand and collecting additional funds through cost sharing. Although 
cost containment measures addressed at health care providers require more difficult and 
politically dangerous decisions and additional conflicts with the medical profession [56], 
it could be concluded that the Croatian health care system and social welfare in Croatia 
could acquire greater benefits from them, rather than from the course of action the 
Government has pursued so far. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 
Throughout the text, exchange rates for respective years used to calculate figures in EUR 
(Euro) from HRK (Croatian Kuna) are official Croatian National Bank midpoint yearly 
exchange rates. Accessible at http://www.hnb.hr/tecajn/etecajn.htm 
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Tables: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1; Per Capita total expenditure on 
health at international dollar rate 
 State 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 304 291 293 322 
Turkey 392 443 391 420 
Romania 359 378 429 469 
Bulgaria 336 381 450 499 
Croatia 628 689 674 630 
Slovakia 595 608 652 723 
Hungary 820 847 961 1078 
Czech 
Republic 932 977 1083 1118 
Slovenia 1299 1356 1487 1547 
Austria 2069 2147 2174 2220 
Italy 1853 2001 2107 2166 
Source: [10]  
Table 2; Total “annual health expenditure 
per capita” growth in % 
State 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 79 -4 1 10 
Turkey 26 13 -12 7 
Romania 13 5 13 9 
Bulgaria 27 13 18 11 
Croatia 9 10 -2 -7 
Slovakia 6 2 7 11 
Hungary 6 3 13 12 
Czech 
Republic 2 5 11 3 
Slovenia 6 4 10 4 
Austria 6 4 1 2 
Italy 3 8 5 3 
Source: Calculated on the basis of [10] 
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Table 3; GDP annual growth in percentages 
 
State 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 10 6 4 4 3 
Turkey 
-5 7 -7 8 6 
Romania 
-1 1 5 4 5 
Bulgaria 2 5 4 5 4 
Croatia 
-1 3 4 5 4 
Slovakia 1 2 4 4 4 
Hungary 4 5 4 3 3 
Czech 
Republic 1 4 3 1 3 
Slovenia 5 4 3 3 3 
Austria 3 3 1 1 1 
Italy 2 3 2 0 0 
Source: [13] 
Table 4; Total expenditure on health as 
percentage of GDP 
 State 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 10.7 9.7 9.2 9.2 
Turkey 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.5 
Romania 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.3 
Bulgaria 6.2 6.5 7.1 7.4 
Croatia* 10 10.2 9.5 9.1 
Slovakia 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.9 
Hungary 7.4 7.1 7.4 7.8 
Czech 
Republic 6.6 6.6 6.9 7 
Slovenia 7.7 8 8.3 8.3 
Austria 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.7 
Italy 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.5 
Source: [10] & [12]* 
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Table 6; General government (public)  expenditure on health as percentage of total 
expenditure on health 
State 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 56.7 52 48.8 49.8 
Turkey 61.1 62.9 62.5 65.8 
Romania 64.9 67.9 67.8 65.9 
Bulgaria 66.5 61.2 55.8 53.4 
Croatia 86.1 86.4 85.5 81.4 
Slovakia 89.9 89.7 89.6 89.4 
Hungary 72.4 70.7 69 70.3 
Czech Republic 91.5 91.4 91.4 91.4 
Slovenia 75.5 76 74.9 74.9 
Austria 69.6 69.6 68.5 69.9 
Italy 72.3 73.7 76 75.6 
Source: [10] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5; Croatia, estimated expenditure on 
health as % of GDP 
Component 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Public 7.6% 8% 8.2% 7.6% 7% 
Private 1.6% 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Source: [12] 
Table 7; Percentage of CIHI Compulsory health Insurance revenue originating from 
salary contributions 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Percentage 78% 77% 75% 82% 
Source: Calculated on the basis of  [12] 
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Table 8; Insured by categories in 2002 and 2003 
Category 2002 2003 
Workers 1,328,356 (31.3%) 1,389,096 (32.3%) 
Farmers 94,150 (2.2%) 85,632 (2.0%) 
Retired 997,971 (23.5%) 1,000,408 (23.3%) 
Unemployed 365,396 (8.6%) 375,258 (8.7%) 
Others 125,334 (3.0%) 139,989 (3.3%) 
Dependants 1.318,679 (31.1%) 1,299,407 (30.2%) 
Refugees 9,224 (0.2%) 7,165 (0.2%) 
Total 4,239,110 (100%) 4,296,955 (100%) 
Source: [21] &[22] 
 
 
 
Table 9; Payroll contribution rate for Social health insurance by country and year 
State Contribution rate 
Croatia (2004) 15% 
Czech Republic (1999) 13,5% 
Estonia (1999) 13% 
Hungary (1999) 14% 
Slovak republic (1999) 13.7% 
Slovenia (1999) 13.25% 
Source: [25] 
 
 
 
Table 10; Average CIHI yearly expenditure per ensured person and dependents in 
2003 (Compulsory insurance) 
Group with dependents Average cost per year (insured and 
dependants) 
Active contributors HRK 2792.65 (EUR 369.40) 
Farmers HRK 2881.87 (EUR 381.20) 
Retired HRK 4293.18 (EUR 567.90) 
Unemployed HRK 1517.98 (EUR 200.80) 
Disabled, incapable for work HRK 2739.56 (EUR 362.40) 
Source: [22] 
 
 
 
 
